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Abstract 
We argue that narratives are central to the success of historical reconstruction. 
Narrative explanation involves tracing causal trajectories across time. The 
construction of narrative, then, often involves postulating relatively speculative 
causal connections between comparatively well-established events. But speculation 
is not always idle or harmful: it also aids in overcoming local underdetermination by 
forming scaffolds from which new evidence becomes relevant. Moreover, as our 
understanding of the past’s causal milieus become richer, the constraints on 
narrative plausibility become increasingly strict: a narrative’s admissibility does not 
turn on mere logical consistency with background data. Finally, narrative explanation 
and explanation generated by simple, formal models complement one another. 
Where models often achieve isolation and precision at the cost of simplification and 
abstraction, narratives can track complex changes in a trajectory over time at the 
cost of simplicity and precision. In combination both allow us to understand and 
explain highly complex historical sequences.  
 
1. Introduction 
In the early 19th Century, a cache of 78 ancient chessmen, mostly carved from walrus 
ivory, were discovered on the Scottish island of Lewis. They are pictured below, with 





Figure 1: Some of the British Museum's Lewis Chessmen. Including King and Queen (front centre), knights (back 
row), bishop (centre), pawns (front ends) and rooks (middle ends). The rook on the right is biting his shield - 
traditional Berserker behaviour. (source: Wikimedia commons) 
 
Who carved them? Where? How did they arrive in the sandbank—or, as another 
account says, that underground cist—on the Isle of Lewis in western-most Scotland? 
No one knows for sure: History, too, has many pieces missing. To play the game, we 
fill the empty squares with pieces of our own imagination. (Brown 2015, 1-2). 
 
This quote demands a narrative: an explanation which follows the causal trajectory 
of the chessmen’s origin and subsequent history. Such narratives are common in 
both historical and scientific reconstruction of the past.1  Nancy Marie Brown’s 
recent popular history Ivory Vikings combines two narratives about the Lewis 
Chessmen. The first story covers the last few centuries, detailing debates between 
art historians, archaeologists and antiquarians about the provenance, manufacture, 
and purpose of the pieces. The second story is set in the 9th to 13th centuries, and 
focuses on the social, cultural and economic world of the Lewis Chessmen: the 
medieval North Atlantic. Brown’s emphasis on the role of imagination—story 
telling—is apt for both narratives. In uncovering history, we draw on material 
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remains such as the those of the economic and social lives of these communities and 
the chessmen themselves, as well as surviving literature like Iceland’s rich sagas and 
hints in the linguistic patterns of contemporary Scandinavian languages—a tapestry 
of evidence. This evidence is fuel for narrative explanation; stories of how and why 
the pieces were made, and how they ended up where they did. In developing 
narratives, imagination plays an important role, as the passage of time erodes 
elements in the chain of causation; there are ‘empty squares’ our imagination must 
fill.  
 
It is our contention that such story-telling is central to successful historical 
reconstruction, and moreover that there is no reason for blanket scepticism about 
such reconstructions. Further, we argue this is just as true for science as it is for 
history. In this regard, practitioners of human history are methodologically 
continuous with archaeologists, geologists, cosmologists and palaeontologists. There 
are differences of course: historical scientists tend to be more concerned with 
understanding general patterns than historians. They seek to identify general 
mechanisms that shape causal trajectories through time; for example, the features 
that determine extinction risk in periods of mass extinction, and those that 
determine extinction risk in less dramatic times. But, like historians, they also aim to 
explain individual historical episodes of particular interest or importance; the 
formation and breakup of Pangaea; the radiation of flowering plants; the 
development and spread of agriculture.  
 
Part of the explanatory agenda of historical science involves the identification of 
similarities between historical trajectories: as noted above, both the general and the 
particular is of interest to them.  The biotic recolonization of Krakatoa after the 
eruption of 1883 might be similar to the re-establishment of ecosystems on other 
volcanic islands after eruptions in informative ways (Thornton 1996). But there are 
non-trivial differences as well, and ecologists are interested in both the differences 
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and the similarities. In contrast, while the oxidation of iron is a process that takes 
place in space and time, and at varying rates depending on local conditions, chemists 
are not typically interested in, say, the specific series of events occurring as an 
abandoned car shell rusts into the soil. For us, a narrative is a specification of an 
individual trajectory of this kind.  
 
As we shall understand them, then, a narrative is a candidate explanation of a 
particular causal trajectory in the past thought to be of interest in its own right. 
Narratives are not mere chronicles—they do more than provide an ordering of 
events. They posit links—often causal—between them;2 earlier events conspire to 
produce later events. This account of narrative leaves much open. Obviously, 
narratives can be more or less detailed. Likewise, narratives may present events as 
being more-or-less contingent.3 In principle, a narrative explanation of the origins of 
World War I might be given precisely to underscore its inevitability, charting a 
perfect storm hitting the European political system early in the twentieth century. 
We also leave open the possibility that a narrative explanation of a particular 
historical episode might be intended to illustrate some general mechanism or 
tendency. A narrative explanation of the origins of World War I might also be 
intended to illustrate the threat to peace posed by political systems involving great 
powers and competing alliances. However, the narrative must intend to capture and 
explain, at some level of grain, the specific features of that trajectory; the features 
that make it of genuine interest.4  
 
We take it as obvious that historians and historical scientists construct narratives. 
Our aim is to defend the epistemic viability and productivity of this practice.  Building 
a narrative might seem unproductively speculative, because a narrative typically 
involves the reconstruction of causal intermediaries that have left no unambiguous 
trace in the present; positing rather than finding links in a causal chain. Since 
narrative explanations explain via these causal chains, the explanation as a whole is 
5 
 
persuasive only if the identification of each link and its causal connections is 
persuasive. That is why the charge of “story-telling”  is potentially serious; leading to 
a supposed contrast between the ‘real’ science, the more-or-less firmly established 
links between material remains and the past, and ‘mere’ storytelling, the 
construction of imagined links between those pockets of evidential confidence.5  
 
Narratives can be problematic in two ways. First, because they are intended to 
specify what is distinctive about a specific trajectory, we cannot take one instance as 
a model of them all (see Tucker 1998). Second, the dispersal and erosion of evidence 
about the sequence—the information destroying processes of decay—often leave 
hypotheses locally underdetermined6 (Turner 2007, Sober 1988). This dispersal is not 
typically uniform: we often have relatively reliable and direct evidence about some 
episodes in the sequence, and much less reliable or direct evidence about others 
(and about the causal connections between them).  Building narratives relies, we 
shall suggest, on some form of story-telling to forge the links between these more 
initially evidentially secure elements of the overall trajectory. Narrative, insofar as it 
involves such reconstructions, it is thought, may play a heuristic role in guiding the 
historian, but narratives are speculative in problematic ways, and the reconstructed 
elements of narratives are insufficiently constrained by the more secure parts. It is 
true (the suspicion runs) that these reconstructed elements must cohere with the 
trace-based elements. But coherence (a merely logical notion) is a weak constraint. 
Too many potential narratives could equally suit our evidence.7  
 
Carol Cleland notes: 
If a historical hypothesis… draws its explanatory power primarily from the 
coherence and continuity of a quasi-fictional story, then historical natural 
science really does seem inferior to experimental science; in the absence of 
empirical warrant a narrative explanation amounts to little more than a ‘just-




Of course some narratives are poor history; poor historical science. They really are 
appropriately mocked as “just-so” stories. But we think a general suspicion of 
narrative-based explanation is misplaced. We shall argue in section two (i) that 
reconstructed narratives need not be problematically speculative, and in historical 
reconstruction they typically are not problematically speculative. Further, (ii) 
speculation often benefits historical reconstruction by guiding the identification of 
further evidence.  In section three we argue (iii) that coherence typically imposes 
quite tight constraints on narrative explanations. Moreover, (iv) there is no 
fundamental epistemic distinction between our identification of episodes in a chain 
of causation for which we have direct, trace-based evidence (so for example a layer 
of shocked quartz and iridium signals a large bolide impact at or near the K/Pg 
boundary) and those episodes we reconstruct from indirect evidence (extinctions 
shortly after the K/Pg events). Finally, in section 4 we shall suggest (v) that narrative 
explanations themselves impose constraints on more general models of historical 
processes. There is a fruitful interplay between general, formal approaches to the 
past and the more particular and discursive approach exemplified by narrative. In 




2. The Supposed Vice of Speculation 
One worry about narrative is that it involves speculation—that it outruns our 
available evidence in problematic ways. We will distinguish between idle and 
productive speculation, and suggest that the latter solves an important problem in 
reconstruction: identifying relevant evidence. Further, productive speculation serves 
to increase the empirical constraints on historical reconstruction, as we shall see in 




The fact that a hypothesis is speculative is—at least often—no objection to its 
scientific legitimacy. Speculation can be a vice, if it is disguised, idle, or a Trojan horse 
for unjustified preconceptions. Indeed, the idea that speculation is such a Trojan 
horse seems to explain Henry Gee’s rejection of narrative in palaeobiology. As he 
sees it, the sparse and patchy data of history make narrative explanations likely to 
reflect our preconceptions back at us. 
… the scale of geological time that scientists are dealing with… is so vast that it 
defies narrative. Fossils, such as the fossils of creatures we hail as our 
ancestors, constitute primary evidence for the history of life, but each fossil is 
an infinitesimal dot, lost in a fathomless sea of time, whose relationship with 
other fossils and organisms living in the present day is obscure. Any story we 
tell against the compass of geological time that links these fossils in sequences 
of cause and effect—or ancestry and descent—is, therefore, only ours to 
make. We invent these stories, after the fact, to justify the history of life 
according to our own prejudices… Geological time admits no narrative in 
which causes can be linked with effects (Gee 2000, 2).8 
 
Gee’s suggestion seems to be that narratives are not just under-determined by the 
data; but that under-determination is deep, unimprovable, and often unnoticed or 
under-estimated. We think that Gee has probably identified a genuine danger. The 
human mind likes stories (Boyd 2009) making the step between finding a story 
attractive, and taking it as true, all too easy. Stories can be seductive, so it is 
important for historians and historical scientists to be methodologically self-aware; 
to be continually concerned with testing their narrative explanations. But we do not 
think that methodological self-awareness is typically absent in the historical sciences. 
Indeed, Alison Wylie has argued that at least in archaeology: 
… archaeological evidence has a striking capacity to disrupt settled 
assumptions, redirecting inquiry and expanding interpretive horizons in 




While it’s always possible to be captured by one’s own stories, we see no reason to 
accept that local under-determination is intractable, even in Gee’s special case of 
ancestor-descendant relations in the fossil record. (See, for example, recent doubts 
that the australopithecines were hominin ancestors: White et al 2015).  
 
So speculation is a vice—is idle—when it is pointless: when it cannot or does not 
productively direct further inquiry; when it is not used to construct alternative 
scenarios to guide a search for evidence which would favour one at the expense of 
the other. There are such speculations in the historical sciences; for example, 
attempts to interpret the specific meaning (as distinct from the functional 
significance) of the material symbolism of long-extinct cultures. See for example 
Martin Porr’s work (2015). Porr’s speculations about Palaeolithic figurines are in fact 
quite plausible, but it is hard to see how he could use them as a guide to further test 
his interpretations. Another example is the thought that sauropod dinosaurs had a 
unique thermoregulative system which switched between endothermia and 
ectothermia in ontogeny (Farlow 1990) .9 This suggestion solves some otherwise 
confusing aspects of sauropod life-ways (see Currie 2016), but has not as yet led to 
further studies. Such speculations have not thus far been coupled with suggestions 
as to how they can be tested and refined, and so are so far empirically idle,10 and 
perhaps open to the worry Gee highlights.11  
 
However, we think unproductive speculation is mercifully rare in science—and 
indeed often knowledge generation is organized to avoid it. For instance, 
palaeontologists use different systems of categorization for trackways and for bodily 
fossils. Fossilized bones and trackways typically record different information at 
different grains.12 Most of the time, attempting to identify what critter left which 
tracks is idle—not only do we lack a method of supporting such hypotheses, but they 
fail to generate new lines of evidence. When Xing et al (2013) identified swimming 
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theropod trackways (the tips of claws dipping into the ancient riverbed) they 
identified them with the ichnogenus Characichnos, not with any particular theropod 
taxa—neither microraptor, nor T. rex, nor any other. The use of parataxonomies13 
insulates palaeontologists from the problematic—idly speculative—idea that one 
might connect a particular trackway to an extinct lineage at as fine a grain as the 
species-level.14 
 
Productive speculation, by contrast, solves a pervasive problem in historical 
reconstruction: identifying evidential relevance. Overcoming underdetermination in 
historical reconstruction requires a wide variety of evidence sources, and it is often 
difficult to identify these sources prior to investigation. Productive speculation 
provides the scaffolding necessary for progress in the face of history’s opacity. Xing 
et al suggest that the trackways indicate a fairly regular swimming pattern in 
theropods—hypotheses potentially amenable to further biomechanical probing. 
Further, such single cases can themselves be compared and contrasted to underwrite 
further hypotheses (and rather systematically, see for example Lockley et al 2014). 
Moreover, while there is probably little point in attempting to unify paratoxonomies 
based on trackways and those derived from bodily remains, this doesn’t mean that 
the two lines of evidence cannot be fruitfully integrated. Working out how extinct 
lineages walked, for instance, often relies on tying together both theories of the 
physiology and anatomy of gait and anatomical reconstructions on the basis of fossils 
and trackways—and the resulting hypotheses are often probed using simulations 
(Turner 2009). On the basis of Xing et al’s (2013) hypothesis that Characichnos tracks 
represented a swimming therapod, they were able to further model how such 
creatures swam. Sellers et al (2013) constructed a simulant sauropod on the basis of 
anatomical and muscular speculation. Examining the simulation, they generated a 
prediction about how sauropods walked. This prediction was borne out via 
examination of sauropod trackways. It was in virtue of the hypotheses which the 
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simulation generated that the trackways were evidentially relevant. Speculation, 
then, reveals avenues for testing and scaffolds further investigation (Currie 2015). 
 
This point applies in human history as well. Brown’s narrative highlights and connects 
two well-confirmed hypotheses about the past. That a large set of chess pieces were 
constructed from walrus ivory somewhere in the Norwegian sphere of cultural 
influence in the medieval North Atlantic; that a skilled Icelandic craftswoman 
(mentioned in the saga of Bishop Pall) named Margret the Adroit was active in the 
early 13th Century, and is identified with a fine ivory crozier discovered in Pall’s tomb. 
Brown attempts to convince us that the two are connected—that Margret herself 
carved the figures. This is storytelling in our sense: Brown posits a causal relationship 
between two events, via an intermediary link for which we have no direct evidence, 
thus shifting from a mere chronicle (that is, a temporal ordering) to a history proper. 
 
Historical reconstruction often proceeds by identifying and overcoming local 
underdetermination —and overcoming underdetermination requires locating 
evidence. On the discovery of the Lewis chessmen, it would have been very difficult 
to predict the features of the North Atlantic that would matter in reconstructing 
their history. It is only, for instance, in light of the hypothesis that they were made in 
Iceland—a hypothesis which itself depends on evidence concerning the ivory trade 
from Greenland and the craft and material capacities of medieval Icelandic culture—
that our knowledge of Bishop Pall and Margret the Adroit is evidentially relevant. As 
noted just above, one way speculation can be productive is when it guides the search 
for relevant new facts. But facts are relevant as and when they impose tighter 
constraints of coherence on suggested narratives. So our response to scepticism 
about speculation depends on our view of the importance of coherence. 
Is Brown’s narrative incurably speculative; and if it is, is this empirical weakness 
representative of narrative reconstruction which fills in links between secure, 
established episodes? The sceptic suspects that while the identification of Margret as 
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the carver coheres with the known facts, such coherence is too weak a constraint. 
There will be many equally good narratives, and no productive way of showing that 
one is more probable than the others. We disagree. Coherence is not mere logical 
consistency with a few known facts, and so plausible narratives are not so easy to 
come by. In the next section we develop these claims. 
 
 
3. In Defence of Coherence 
Coherence is a much-under-rated epistemic virtue. Achieving it involves much more 
than establishing mere logical consistency between what is said about one stage of a 
trajectory and what is said about the other stages. If a narrative of the recolonisation 
of Krakatoa or the making of the Lewis chessmen is coherent, it has satisfied many 
empirical and theoretical constraints. In the case of the Lewis chessmen, our 
narrative must of course avoid human impossibilities (virgin births; hale and hearty 
150-year olds) and improbable co-incidences (identical twins separated at birth 
meeting on a desert island). But more seriously, the agents and their interactions 
have to be of the kind made available by the social, technical, ideological and 
economic resources of the medieval North Atlantic world. Brown’s identification of 
Margret the Adroit depends, for example, on high-end walrus-ivory carving being a 
rare skill; there were few in that world who could have made those pieces. 
Constraints like this are often difficult to simultaneously satisfy; despite their best 
efforts, deliberate historical fictions often fail it, as historical novels often project 
contemporary attitudes and responses into (for example) early nineteenth century 
agents.15 Analogous constraints are relevant to narrative reconstruction in the 
historical sciences: a reconstruction of the greening of Krakatoa has to be consistent 
with obvious general principles of ecology (no herbivores before herbs) but also with 
many specific factors that characterise the local region. The supposed early pioneers 
must be available within the regional biota; the dispersal mechanisms must be 
independently credible; the conditions on Krakatoa after the eruption (as attested by 
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geochemistry) must be within their known physiological tolerances, and so on. In 
evolutionary biology, phylogeny provides an increasingly powerful constraint on 
candidate narratives, as information about the timing and branching patterns of 
major clades becomes increasingly available.  
 
In the rest of this section we show how tightly these constraints, in favourable cases, 
constrain potential narratives, and how our understanding of these regional (and 
sometimes global) mechanisms lessen the epistemic significance of the distinction 
between episodes which leave a direct trace, and episodes whose character must be 
reconstructed indirectly.  
 
The key idea is that the significance of a trace is itself inferential. When a narrative 
specifies a sequence of events in the past—a pyroclastic eruption; a smoking mound 
of volcanic debris; a mound cooled and moistened by rain; a mound with an initial 
dusting of organic materials; the arrival of small spiders and other small insects on 
the wind; a little erosion and soil formation—we should not divide these events into 
those which are directly attested by their surviving signature in the present, and 
those which are merely inferred or imagined. For all traces need to be interpreted in 
the light of often complex and sometimes controversial middle range theory; theory 
that tells us how an event’s footprint at a time is made and then transformed.16 
There are of course massive differences in reliability: we can very reliably infer from 
megalodon fossil teeth to the presence of a very large predatory shark in the oceans 
of the recent past. The tooth is a trace, and it is a very reliable signature of a large 
predator. We also have reliable evidence that the megalodon is no longer with us, 
and has not been since the Pliocene or early Pleistocene. That knowledge about the 
past is not based on a trace; rather, it is based on our failure to find traces in many 
deposits where we might expect them, had the megalodon existed at later times. 
While some inferences are very reliable, others are less so: inferring the megalodon’s 
hunting strategy is less secure, even though those teeth provide clues, especially 
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when combined with robust patterns in shark behaviour. Even so, our knowledge of 
the shark’s existence is more secure than our knowledge of its behaviour. That said, 
inferring events in the past on the basis of their material remains is not different in 
kind, epistemically speaking, from less direct inferential strategies. We have 
knowledge of hominin diets from direct traces: from the nature of teeth and jaws; 
from isotope studies of bones. We have knowledge from indirect sources: from wear 
patterns on stone tools; from middens and other remains; from inferences from 
skeletal remains to estimates of the shape and volume of gut tissue; from 
calculations about energetic demands imposed by hominin morphology and 
developmental biology. These evidential streams do not differ in a principled way vis-
à-vis their reliability or their dependence on middle range theory. So while the 
inference from a trace to its historical cause is sometimes very reliable indeed, traces 
do not give us theoretically unmediated, observation-like access to the past. Thus, 
while some episodes in a trajectory are identifiable with greater reliability than 
others, we shall suggest that the differences are mostly differences of degree. 
 
We insist that coherence often imposes tight constraints on potential narrative 
explanations; under those circumstances, the production of a narrative is itself an 
epistemic achievement. We will begin our defence of that claim with a reminder of 
how rich, and richly enmeshed in our knowledge of general mechanisms, our 
knowledge of the past can be.  
 
Consider, for example, the discovery of a fossil bone: say, a tibia. From this discovery, 
we can infer the existence of the bone’s owner, for we understand how, over long 
periods of time and under specific conditions, bones can be remineralized while 
retaining their structure. Moreover, we can identify the owner of the bone as a 
vertebrate, as that anatomical structure is only known in vertebrates. And from this, 
we can infer that the owner of the tibia also had a fibula, again through our 
knowledge of vertebrate anatomy. The structure of the bone and histology might 
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yield further clues about the bone’s owner: the fine structures of mammal bones 
differ from those of birds, reptiles and other non-mammalian animals. Often 
anatomical structure allows relatively safe inferences about whether the animal was 
bipedal or quadrupedal. From information about anatomy we can often infer gait, 
due to stable regularities between these features (Davis 1964). For instance, an equal 
ratio between forelimb and hindlimb length signals a cursorial gait in quadrupeds. 
Moreover, features of anatomy, ancestry and gait are suggestive of features of the 
animal’s physiology—its thermoregulation, its energetic demands and the like. Well-
resolved phylogenetic analysis places the organism into ancestral context, as well as 
underwriting further reconstruction via the comparative method. Teeth, in 
particular, often carry phylogenetic as well as functional information. The fossil’s 
stratigraphic placement can carry information about its age and about its 
palaeoecology, though again only with the assistance of a rich set of middle range 
theories about site formation and taphonomy, and the physics of radioactive decay 
and other dating methods.  
 
Thus fossils often carry informationally rich signals from the past, but only do so in 
conjunction with a complex set of bodies of knowledge, ranging from information 
about local environmental features, to regularities across phylogenetic groups, to 
physical and chemical processes of decay. Indeed, the fact that a fossil is the 
mineralised bone of a once living animal is itself an important and unobvious 
discovery (Rudwick 1972). In making these points about palaeobiology and 
palaeoecology, we are not (yet) building a narrative. Rather, our point is that the 
richer our general picture of a causal milieu, the more constrained any narrative 
hypothesis about a trajectory through that milieu will be. The library of plausible 
stories shrinks rapidly. The historical sciences of geology and palaeobiology have 
developed, and are further developing, increasingly rich, and temporally well-
resolved models of the past’s causal structure, especially those of the relatively 
recent past. We now have quite detailed models of the palaeoecology and climate of 
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the Pliocene and Pleistocene world, and these sharply constrain the narratives we 
can give of (say) hominin evolution. For example, there is unmistakable evidence of 
major dietary changes beginning a little more than two million years ago: with 
reductions in tooth and jaw size and reductions in the musculature powering those 
jaws, while at approximately the same time relative brain size (and brains are 
energetically expensive tissue) began to increase. The nature of this change remains 
controversial (though probably involving some mix of increases to both meat 
consumption and food processing) but the signal of a major change is not 
controversial. Any narrative of hominin evolution needs to be integrated with these 
and many other aspects of hominin morphology, physiology, behaviour, and 
distribution in space and time.  The rich and varied evidential streams historical 
scientists exploit constrain the space of plausibility. Generating good narratives 
under such circumstances is a significant epistemic achievement. 
 
Time to take stock. Here is a simple, generalized account of an historical 
reconstruction’s warrant. We understand the processes which shape history. 
Fossilization, political revolutions, mineralization, mass-extinctions, economic 
pressures, and so forth, have more-or-less regular effects. Moreover, the signs of 
those effects change over time in reasonably recognisable and well-understood 
ways. Reconstruction of the past is possible in virtue of these processes and our 
understanding of them. Typically, when people consider the evidence underlying 
reconstruction, they think of it as a causal web linking some past event to the 
present. Processes of mineralisation and taphonomy link a fossilized bone, a current 
trace, to an extinct animal; and our understanding of fossil formation, site 
transformation, and biology gives us some understanding of that animal. But these 
causal webs also link events in the past to one another (Currie 2016). In one of the 
historical sciences’ most famous cases, there is a causal web linking an impact crater, 
an iridium layer, shocked quartz, and tektites to regional and global environmental 
change, and to the extinction of a spectacular group of animals. The role of these 
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events in the extinction remains controversial, but any narrative of biotic turnover at 
the K/Pg boundary must incorporate these elements. 
 
What is true on this grand scale is likewise true on a smaller scale. Brown connects 
the Lewis chessmen to Margret the Adroit: the latter carved the former. The basis for 
this involves an understanding of many local facts about Iceland’s history—these 
facts play the same kind of role as fossilization, stratigraphy and comparative 
anatomy in reconstructing extinct animals. Brown identifies Bishop Pall as a likely 
sponsor for the chess pieces. His emphasis on beautifying the church with music and 
architecture (rather than delivering radical sermons) is specified in the saga bearing 
his name, and reinforced by archaeological finds. Moreover, his ideological stance 
towards church and state matches that implied by the chess-set. According to Brown, 
more radical bishops would be unlikely to invest in a version of chess which relegates 
religion’s power to such a subsidiary role. Iceland’s importance in the trade of 
walrus-ivory from Greenland is well documented both in sagas and archaeology. 
Specific correlations between historical Icelandic individuals (such as Queen Gunnhild 
the Grim) and the carved figures further link the finds with Iceland.  
 
Brown’s reconstruction is far from certain. But just as middle-range theories of 
taphonomy support the inference from fossil tooth to extinct animal to its 
palaeoecology, the confluence of evidence generated by our knowledge of the 
Medieval North Atlantic connect Margret the Adroit to the Lewis Chessmen. And, 
potentially, this connection could itself form the basis of (or at least inform) further 
conjectures about the past. For example, one might attempt isotope or other 
chemical analyses of the chessmen, or analysis of the artistic styles and techniques, 
to link that ivory to other potential examples of Margret’s work. A well-established 
link to Margret, and thus Iceland and Pall, could lead to further ideas about the 
purpose of the chess-set (were they, for instance, a gift involved in solidifying 




The construction of a narrative, then, is a considerable epistemic achievement: our 
rich knowledge of the past’s causal structures provides strict constraints on 
admissibility. We think that this conclusion about narrative explanation is true of 
explanation more generally. As our information about the causal background is 
enriched, coherence becomes an increasingly important, increasingly demanding 
constraint. So, for example, a theory of the stability conditions of human cooperation 
has to fit a large number of empirical and theoretical constraints. When highly 
constrained narratives are also productive, when they underlie further testing and 
identify further evidence, they also extend our reach into the past. 
 
 
4. Narratives and Models 
In the last two sections we have, in effect, fended off claims that narrative 
explanations fail to live up to the epistemic standards of good science. Indeed, story-
telling extends our reach into the past, overcoming underdetermination by enabling 
the identification of relevant evidence. In this section, we make explicit an idea that 
has so far been implicit: narrative explanations add something methodologically 
central to the historical sciences, specifically, they complement formal models and 
quantitative techniques.  
 
We should clarify what we take this complementary relationship to be. In the context 
of historical reconstruction—the process of uncovering the past—narratives and 
models can be understood as performing different roles which match their distinct 
theoretical virtues. Formal models in the historical sciences enable theorists to 
explicitly represent and assess varying hypotheses about the relative importance of 
different factors, and to represent different scenarios in which the same factors 
operate, but with different relative strengths and across different background 
conditions. Paleoclimatological models probe the sensitives between global 
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temperatures and atmosphere in the deep past; biomechanical simulations can 
generate and support hypotheses about the gait of extinct critters. But formal 
models are less good at capturing complexity and in representing how background 
factors change as history unfolds. Models face trade-offs between complexity and 
tractability, and are forced to make simplifying assumptions.17 Narrative explanations 
can incorporate complexity: as we saw above in discussing coherence, as our picture 
of the environment in which history is unfolding becomes richer and more detailed, 
the narrative explanations of those dynamics become more tightly constrained. A 
bug for one approach is a feature for the other. Just as models make explicit relative 
importance amongst a narrow and tightly specified set of factors, typically acting in 
somewhat idealised conditions, narratives can and should make explicit the 
complexity of causal trajectories and the interaction between a change in a focal 
phenomenon (for instance, the evolutionary emergence of distinctive forms of 
human cooperation) and the environmental and evolutionary background in which 
that trajectory takes place. They do so though, at the cost of quantitative precision. 
This is one respect in which the methods are complementary: one picks up the detail 
and specificity that the other almost inevitably sacrifices in search of generality. In 
other contexts, models and narratives may be further integrated,18 but we will focus 
on their complementarity. 
 
We just mentioned human cooperation for a reason. The question of how our 
lineage evolved our distinctive, complex social worlds is one which lends itself to 
both narrative and model-based probing. In effect, a narrative explanation of the 
emergence of human cooperation provides a causal sequence linking base-line 
conditions—great-ape-like social worlds—to extensively cooperative arrangements 
such as our own, wherein cooperative and collective action is obligatory. Recently, 
Boehm, Tomasello, and Sterelny have all published narrative-style explanations of 
the emergence of such cooperation (Boehm 2012, Tomasello 2014, Sterelny 2012). 
These narratives all depend on formal models to isolate and explore the potential 
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causal interactions between different features of these changing worlds. But 
nonetheless, all three candidate explanations are narratives. By contrast, Sam Bowles 
and Herb Gintis’s The Cooperative Species (2011) is a sophisticated and impressive 
attempt to give an account of the evolution of human cooperation, and is no 
narrative—rather, a series of formal quantitative models are used. There is no 
attempt to trace a trajectory of changes from our ancestors to ourselves. And nor is 
there a “master model” in which the various factors which combined to make human 
cooperation possible — social learning and teaching; cooperation with respect to 
inter-group competition; the evolution of norms and punishment; reciprocation; 
reproductive cooperation — are all represented. Such a “master model” would be 
intractable.  We will discuss their project in some detail, not because we think poorly 
of it, but because it is such an impressive instance of its kind; its clarity and power 
serve to show the limits of trying to do without narrative altogether, in giving an 
explanation of a complex, multi-stage transition.  
 
Instead of a narrative, Bowles and Gintis try to show that the evolution of each 
element in the cooperation stew is plausible, factor by factor. In effect, the various 
ingredients of human cooperation are treated formally in isolation. The strategy is to 
take a series of distinctive features of human social life — helping, punishment, 
responsiveness to norms, intergroup aggression — and develop a cluster of models 
that represent the emergence of each feature, typically holding fixed a set of 
background conditions, but equally typically showing that the trait’s emergence does 
not depend on very particular, or implausibly extreme, parameter values.  Their 
nuanced, complex picture rules out the option of a master model in which all these 
ingredients are represented, and a set of plausible trajectories generated. Instead, 





This model-based strategy, eschewing a narrative, and without a master model, 
means that there is no explicit representation of the coordinated evolution of the 
suite of social, cognitive, communicative, demographic and motivational factors that 
ultimately made our extraordinary levels and kinds of cooperation possible. That is a 
gap in itself: there is no integrated step by step account of the transition to human 
ultra-cooperation. In principle, a set of models of this form could be used, in 
conjunction with historical data, to construct a constrained narrative, with the 
narrative account of change in each key aspect of human social life tightly 
constrained by the appropriate model in the set. In practice, this conception 
understates the complementarity of the two approaches. A narrative can make 
salient hidden constraints on the models. To see this, consider Bowles & Gintis’ 
approach to punishment.  
 
The standard view of punishment is that while it is easy to explain the stability of 
collective punishment it is difficult to explain its origins. When the willingness to 
punish is common, it is easily maintained as cost is low: because punishment is rarely 
necessary, and the costs are divided amongst the participants. Conversely, when it’s 
rare (as all traits initially are), it is very expensive, for freeriders have not yet learned 
to desist through fear of punishment, and because the cost is spread across the few 
rather than the many. Bowles and Gintis dissent from this line of thought. They 
suppose that an agent’s willingness to punish is sensitive to her assessment of its 
cost and effectiveness. So punishment invades as a conditional, threshold-dependent 
strategy. Punishers punish only when (perhaps initially through chance) they reach a 
threshold in the local environment. This strategy allows their frequency to grow, 
since coordinated punishment is not too expensive, and the threat of punishment, 
allied to the knowledge of past punishment, induces non-punishers to cooperate. So 
punishers are compensated for the costs of punishment by the rewards of 
cooperation, and since punishers enforce cooperation through punishment only 
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when those willing to punish are locally common, most of those rewards of 
cooperation go to those who signal their willingness to punish.  
 
The idea, then, is that punishment invades as a conditional strategy, as a signal and 
response system that enables players using it to benefit from cooperation. A 
problem for this analysis arises when it is embedded in a larger narrative. If the 
control of freeriding is critical in establishing a cooperative social environment, and if 
freeriding must be controlled by punishment, coordinated punishment must evolve 
early in the transition from great ape to sapiens-like social worlds.19 But these 
models also assume capacities to signal, to interpret signals and to coordinate in 
inflicting punishment; capacities that would only evolve late, because they evolve 
only in a social environment that is already much more cooperative than those 
revealed by great ape ethnography. Conditional punishment is too sophisticated to 
be an early and foundational form of social behaviour. Tracking a punishment 
threshold depends on active and reliable signalling and interpretation, as conditional 
punishers census their local density. We expect signal-comprehension-coordination 
capacities to evolve incrementally in a cooperative world; they cannot be assumed 
for free as an explanation of the origins of such a world. Moreover, the models 
assume that non-punishers cooperate in response to punishment, rather than 
counter-punish. This assumption is far from trivial, for in experimental games, 
punishment quite often attracts counter-punishment rather than cooperation 
(Herrmann, Thöni et al. 2008; Gächter and Herrmann 2009). The best guess is that 
punishment only induces cooperation when it is seen as legitimate. Otherwise 
punishment is treated as mere aggression. Thus punishment is most effective in 
controlling freeriding only in late-evolving social environments; environments in 
which something like norms of cooperation are established and salient to all. So the 
lack of a master model masks an ambiguity about the emergence of punishment. To 
explain the stability of cooperation, it seems as if it must emerge early, but then its 
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emergence cannot depend on cognitive capacities that probably evolved only in late 
hominins. 
 
The natural modelling strategy is decompositional: to take each aspect of the 
cooperation complex (punishment, norm-sensitivity, reputation effects, insider-
outsider discrimination, moral emotions) and to model its emergence and stability 
separately. This strategy makes it easy to tacitly assume, in modelling the evolution 
of one ingredient of the cooperation stew, backgrounded but important factors that 
have yet to be cooked. That is one reason why we need a detailed and explicit 
scenario specifying the changing lineage as a whole, that is, a narrative. 
 
In reconstructing the past, then, narrative and models form a mutually 
constraining—and supporting—set of epistemic tools. Highly complex explananda 
like the evolution of human cooperation are resistant to approaches which depend 
solely on the decomposition and abstraction which enables modellers to probe 
aspects of constituent dynamics in isolation. For highly complex, multi-factorial, and 
multi-stage causal trajectories there are no master-models to be had, and so we 
must instead combine narratives and models, allowing us to navigate between the 
trade-offs generated by complexity. There is a lesson here for story-tellers as well. 
Historians often—perhaps characteristically—shy away from abstract, formal 
approaches to explanation and reconstruction (precisely because these distract from 
the contingent details). But our discussion suggests that even when historians aim 









Brown emphasizes the role of imaginative storytelling in her history of the Lewis 
Chessmen. Such story-telling has its dangers: when based on idle speculation, the 
seductive qualities of a good tale can be misleading. However, we have seen that in 
both history and historical science these worries can be overplayed and can obscure 
the real benefits—in fact the centrality—of developing narratives in successful 
historical reconstruction. Speculation is often productive: it furthers our epistemic 
reach by enabling us to identify the diverse lines of evidence knowledge of the past 
requires. Further, narratives are themselves embedded in—and part of—that 
confluence of evidence. And this makes coherence a serious hurdle; the articulation 
of a narrative is a significant epistemic achievement, and becomes more serious as 
the historical sciences progress. Finally, narratives do not play second-fiddle to 
formal, idealized models. The relationship is instead a partnership where each 
partner compensates for the limits of the other. This last point deserves another: 
insofar as formal, quantified methods and means of expression are unsuitable to the 
development of narratives, our argument that narrative is central to historical 
reconstruction makes a case for not over-playing the importance of the formal and 
the quantified in legitimate science. 
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Endnotes 
1 For general discussion of historical science, see Cleland 2002, Currie & Turner 2016. 
2  We take narratives to be causal (though not all do), but we will not argue that here. Likewise, we 
will remain neutral on the nature of cause and causal explanation. 
3 Pace John Beatty’s view (2016). 
4 Our account of narrative is intended to be more-or-less consistent with others in the literature. 
One of us Currie (2014) has previously endorsed an extremely thin notion of narrative, identifying it 
with the explanation of token events; the other Sterelny (forthcoming) has identified narrative with 
explanations with particular modal properties. Other philosophers (Hull 1975, Roth 2008, Beatty 
2016) provide accounts of narrative which do not depart from our account in ways which matter to 
our argument. 
5 The ‘story-telling isn’t science’ stance is most often expressed in casual conversation, but it is 
expressed in Aunger’s (1995) discussion of skepticism about ethnographic reports, Herrick’s (2004) 
position that science is not ‘objective’ but rather provides ‘narrative coherence’,  the apparent 
conflict between ‘narrative’ and ‘evidence-based’ approaches to medicine (Miesel & Karlawish 2011 
discuss, but do not endorse the conflict) and those  biological scientists decrying 'just-so stories’ 
(starting from Gould & Lewontin 1979). For a quite different defence of the role of storytelling in 
science, see Grobstein (2005) 
6 Hypotheses are locally underdetermined when the currently available evidence is insufficient to 
distinguish between them (as opposed to the hypotheses having identical empirical consequences). 
7 These complaints are not often found in the published literature, but both of us have met it 
regularly in conversation, and one of us regularly in referee’s reports on his narrative-based 
explanations of hominin evolutionary history.  
8 It’s worth pointing out that Gee’s complaints are specifically about identifying fossil taxa with living 
taxa, claiming, for instance, that some extinct lineage is the ancestor of some extant lineage (as 
opposed to a sister-taxa). And indeed such claims may be problematically speculative—but are not 
so in virtue of their narrative quality. 
9 Presumably this is not idle speculation in principle: it strikes us that hibernation and related 
behaviours could provide inroads to the mechanisms behind changes in thermoregulation. 
10 Such speculation might be justified in contexts when how-possibly explanations are called for, as 
in some adaptationist explanations of complex traits. 
11 Gould & Lewontin’s complaints about adaptationist reasoning is in part clarified by this distinction: 
the charge of ‘just-so’ storytelling is in effect the charge of idle speculation: adaptationist 
hypotheses fail to open new investigative routes and actively discourage them (here is not the place 
to consider whether such a charge is plausible). 
12 See Turner 2007 and Finkelman 2016 for philosophical discussion of paratoxonomies. 
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13 Here ‘parataxonomy’ refers to taxonomies tracking different kinds of trace (i.e., fossilized bones 
versus fossilized trackways). We gather (thanks to a referee) that this term Is sometimes used to 
indicate alternative taxonomies constructed by, say, amateurs and professionals. 
14 Palaeontologists call non-body fossils such as trackways or burrows ‘trace-fossils’, we are using 
‘trace’ in a more general way here, as referring to a present outcome of a past event or process. 
15  For example: Matthew Hervey, the hero of Allan Mallinson’s enjoyable series based on the British 
Army of the Napoleonic War is suspiciously free of the class and ethnic prejudices of the time.  
16 The term ‘middle-range’ theory is from the archaeologist Lewis Binford (1977) and adapted by 
Peter Kosso (2001). 
17 For general discussions of the trade-offs in modeling see Michael Weisberg (2012).  
18 See, for instance, Currie’s (2014) discussion of ‘simple’ narrative explanations. 
19 The social world of great apes is not typically one of interactions only amongst close kin, so 
cooperation evolved in a world of overlapping, only partially coordinated evolutionary interest: kin 
selection might be some of the story, but it is not most of the story. 
 
